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JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES. By Peter Irons. New York: Oxford University
Press. 1983. Pp. xiii, 407. $18.95.
Peter Irons's 1 Justice at War adds new evidence to the extensive
array of literature2 attacking the internment of Japanese Americans

1. Peter Irons is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California at
San Diego, and is the author of THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982).
2. For scathing condemnations of the Supreme Court's decisions, see Dembitz, Racial .Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo .Decisions,
45 COLUM. L. REv. 175 (1945); Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A .Disaster, 54 YALE
L.J. 489 (1945); see also M. GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED 354 (1949); J. TENBROEK, E.
BARNHART AND F. MATSON, PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1954); Freeman,
Genesis, Exodus, and Leviticus: Genealogy, Evacuation and Law, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 414
(1943). In the years since Dembitz's and Rostow's articles were published, "not a single legal
scholar or writer has attempted a substantive defense of the Supreme Court opinions." P. 371.
Despite the government's claim that the evacuation was a military necessity, numerous authors
have argued not only that hindsight has shown that this was not in fact the case, but also that
the military knew or at least should have known the falsity of the claim at the time of the
evacuation. See, e.g., F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY (1962); M. GRODZINS, supra; C. MCWILLIAMS, WHAT ABOUT OUR JAPANESE-AMERICANS? {1944); J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART &
F. MATSON, supra; Freeman, supra; Rostow, supra. But see WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY,
U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PHAsES OF THE WRA PROGRAM
(1946). Further, a recent congressionally established commission investigated the internment
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during World War II and the Supreme Court cases that sanctioned
the internment.3 In Justice at War, Irons focuses on lawyers who
could have prevented the internment tragedy - those who had significant connections with the original evacuation decisions and the
court cases testing those decisions. He takes for granted, and indeed
one might hope, that those lawyers should have been sufficiently
principled to ignore the clear prejudice that motivated the internment, competent enough to recognize the constitutional rights that
the internment violated, and sufficiently dedicated and independent
to pursue a course that would vindicate those rights. Yet that clearly
did not happen, and Irons is able to document convincingly "a deliberate campaign to present tainted records to the Supreme Court" (p.
-viii) in the cases that upheld the government's actions. In fact, based
on the evidence Irons uncovered while researching his book, he and
other attorneys have sought to reverse the wartime convictions of
Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Minoru Yasui4 by using
the ancient writ of coram nobis, which allows a court to reverse its
initial decision if that decision was affected by fundamental error or
a party's misconduct. Irons asserts that the record he has uncovered
reveals "a legal scandal without precedent in the history of American law'' (p. viii). Regardless of the accuracy of this statement, Irons
presents strong documentation of a scandal of vast proportions.
On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 authorizing the Secretary of War to prescribe military areas
and to exclude " 'any or all persons' " (p. 48) from those areas. In
the Internment Cases, the government was forced to defend this order, as well as the congressional action and military orders that followed it, in the face of exclusionary measures directed solely toward
Japanese Americans. The government argued that "military necessity" justified applying those measures to a single class of citizens.
The purported military necessity was based on the notion that Japanese Americans were predisposed to disloyalty, sabotage, and espionage because of their distinctive racial characteristics. Given the
complete absence of hard evidence that any Japanese American had
menaced national security either before or after Pearl Harbor (pp.
145-46, 179), the government had a difficult task buttressing its
arguments.
(soliciting Irons' testimony) and similarly concluded that no military necessity existed. The
commission attributed the evacuation and internment primarily to political pressures. See
REPORT OF THE COMMN. ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PER•
SONAL JUSTICE DENIED (1982).

3. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding conviction for violating
military order directing exclusion from "Military Area" by remaining in the area); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding conviction for violations of military
curfew); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943) (same).
4. See note 3 supra.
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To overcome this difficulty, Irons argues, government attorneys
crossed the boundary of legitimate advocacy and entered into the
realm of deceit (p. ix). Irons leaves little doubt in his exceedingly
well-documented account that at the time of the exclusion the military knew the falsity of a number of the "facts" on which it was
relying to show "military necessity." Additionally, though Justice
Department lawyers who represented the government discovered
that the military knew the falsity of some of its claims, they failed to
inform the Court. 5 Thus, this is not simply a case where the benefits
of hindsight clearly reveal that a mistake has been made.
While Justice at War does more than delineate acts of attorney
misconduct,6 it is with these acts that Irons is primarily concerned.
In them, he sees "profound questions of legal ethics and professional
responsibility" (p. ix). Although the code of legal ethics requires a
lawyer to represent his or her client's interests zealously, it also
demands that lawyers "function as officers of the courts, sworn to
canons of fairness and justice" (p. ix). Lawyers may only present the
courts with evidence they know to be truthful. Irons clearly demonstrates that government lawyers breached this latter duty by failing
to inform the courts of the questionable validity of evidence intended to justify the military's actions.
Justice at War also examines the ethical dilemmas that faced
some of the government lawyers when what they perceived as their
professional responsibility conflicted with their personal beliefs.
Each of the government lawyers involved felt this conflict differently,
but for all, in the end, personal qualms bowed to the "demands of
5. The accuracy of this grave charge appears to have been confirmed by the Justice Department's response to the claims recently filed against it in the challenge to Korematsu and by
the judge's determination of that challenge. The charge against the government was that it
had knowingly presented false evidence of the existence of a "military necessity." On October
4, 1983, the government joined Irons and Korematsu's other attorneys in requesting that the
Court set aside the conviction. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1983, at A24, coL 1. In mid-November,
Federal District Judge Patel did so. Although the Justice Department did not admit to any
governmental misconduct - it stated instead that it was not fighting the case because the
evacuation program was "an unfortunate episode in our nation's history" that should be "put
behind us" - Judge Patel interpreted the Justice Department's conciliatory approach to be
tantamount to a confession of error. The Supreme Court's decision, she stated, was "based on
unsubstantiated facts, distortions and misrepresentations." Bad Landmark, TIME, Nov. 21,
1983, at 51.
In 1983, bills were introduced and referred to the judiciary committees in both houses of
Congress to provide for payments to certain Japanese Americans and others who were detained, interned or relocated by the United States during World War II. See S. 1520, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 2116, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3387, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); H.R. 4110, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
6. In addition to exploring these instances of misconduct, Irons depicts the influence of
political pressures in the government's decisions to begin and end the evacuation. He illuminates the tactical disputes among the lawyers on both sides, disputes that indicate what these
lawyers thought about the various justifications for the actions taken and about the conflict
between institutional loyalty and personal conscience. He also discusses the lawyers' arguments before the courts and the courts' subsequent deliberations and opinions.
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duty" (p. 350). As Irons shows, the conflict for a government lawyer
may be particularly acute, because he or she has a dual professional
responsibility "as the advocate for his federal client and as defender
of the Constitution" (p. 350).
Irons focuses on Edward Ennis, a Justice Department lawyer
with a major role in formulating the government's positions in the
test cases. Ennis personified the conflict between professional obligation and personal conscience because, unlike many others, he did
not simply·view the War Department, which was promulgating and
enforcing military orders pursuant to Roosevelt's Executive Order,
as his client. He objected to the notion that the Justice Department
should passively offer all the arguments that the War Department
told it to make without exercising some independent judgment.
Ennis distrusted the War Department's claims and believed the
evacuation and internment were unconstitutional, yet there was a
limit to what he would do to back up those beliefs. He considered,
but decided against, resigning when the evacuation decision was first
made (p. 62). Later, while defending the government's actions in the
courts, he believed the government was obliged to be frank and to
confess the doubts it felt about the military's position. Unable to
prevail within the government, Ennis went behind the scenes and
actually undercut the government's position by helping to shape the
opposition's legal strategy (pp. 182, 302-05). Again, however, Ennis
chose not to resign and signed the government's Korematsu brief "as
a sign of institutional loyalty'' (p. 302). Thus, despite Ennis's belief
that the internment was immoral and unconstitutional, he eventually
capitulated and supported his client - the government. Ennis has
attempted to account for his defense of programs he personally opposed; he stressed the demands of duty, explaining that he had seen
it as his responsibility to state his position and then do the job determined by his superiors (p. 350). But Irons questions Ennis's approach, believing that more forceful action by Ennis might have
altered the unfortunate outcome of Korematsu (p. 351).
Two of the incidents of governmental misconduct that Irons documents best illustrate the difficulty Ennis and his assistant, John
Burling, faced in attempting to merge their personal and professional roles. First, while preparing the Hirabayashi brief, Ennis
learned that the intelligence agency responsible for advising General
John DeWitt, the ranking west coast military figure, had told the
General that selective evacuation of Japanese Americans was preferable to mass evacuation. Ennis told the Solicitor General, who had
control over the briefs, that since they were now defending the army
on the basis that selective evacuation had been impracticable, they
had to consider what their obligation to the Court was "in view of
the fact that the responsible intelligence agency regarded a selective
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evacuation . . as preferable" (p. 204). Ennis warned that failure to
advise the Court of the existence of this information might "approximate the suppression of evidence" (p. 204). But even though the
final brief stated the opposite of the intelligence agency's conclusion,
Ennis, as a loyal government lawyer, "swallowed his doubts and
added his name to the . . . brief' (p. 206).
A second conflict arose when FBI and FCC reports ordered by
the Justice Department at Ennis's prompting cast doubt on the accuracy of claims that some Japanese Americans were spying and signalling to offshore submarines. General DeWitt had made. such
claims in a document entitled Final Report, Japanese Evacuation
From the West Coast, 1942. The FBI and FCC reports showed that
DeWitt knew that the statements about the radio signalling were
false both at the time he recommended the evacuation and at the
time he included the charges in the Final Report as a central reason
for the evacuation (p. 284). In a draft of their brief, Burling and
Ennis included a footnote that would have notified the Court that
the Final Report's claims about illegal radio transmitters and signalling conflicted with information that the Justice Department possessed. Heated debates between and within the Justice and War
Departments ensued, in which Burling and Ennis argued that the
government had an ethical obligation not to cite the Final Report.
But the final footnote, though subtly expressing some doubts about
the veracity of parts of the Final Report, contained no reference to
specific conflicting information (p. 292). And again, despite their
vehement disagreement with the decision not to express forthrightly
the existence of these "lies" to the Court, Ennis and Burling signed
the brief. "Institutional loyalty had prevailed over personal conscience" (p. 292).
Though Irons states that Justice at War "is not intended as a
brief' (p. xii) on behalf of the clients he is now representing, at times
the style of the book resembles a brief in its overt, and to this reader
successful, attempt to persuade. This argumentativeness detracts a
bit from the sense of outrage that Irons tries to convey, especially
since the facts themselves are sufficient to make the point. Yet despite the tenor of advocacy conveyed by comments such as "a legal
scandal of unprecedented scope and consequence" (p. 254), Irons's
conclusions, though forcefully stated, can hardly be doubted. To
Irons, "the historical record of the Japanese American wartime
cases," supports ''the conclusion that their outcome reflected the failure of the legal system" (p. 365).

